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I 
i IN THE SUPREME COURT 
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
I 
I DESERET ARCHITECTS AND \ 
I EXGINEERS and NORTH,IVEST-
[ ERN NAT ION AL INSURANCE 
I COMP ANY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
S 10 N OF UTAH, MURREL 
HOCKENBURY, JR., TERMI-
XEX, INC., and THE STATE 
IXSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
11139 
This case involves a controversy between two in-
>urance carriers. The question presented is who is liable 
ior \rorkmen's Compensation to the claimant, Murrel 
Hockenbury, Jr. It is not disputed that on or about 
1 
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January 16, 1967, that Mr. Hockenbury suffered an 
injury which occurred during the course and scope of 
his employment. The defendant, The State Insurance 
Fund, was on this date the insurance carrier for Ter-
minex, Inc. The plaintiff, Northwestern N ationa] Jn. 
surance Company, was the insurance carrier for Deseret 
Architects and Engineers. 
A heari11g was had in this matter on April 24, 1967, 
whereby the facts set forth above were agreed to by 
the parties. ( R. 20 & 21) 
Prior to the fall of 1966, the applicant was em-
ployed by Terminex, Inc. as a salesman in regard to 
pest control services. Mr. Hockenbury's duties for Ter· 
minex were to sell the services of this employer based 
upon "leads" received by personal contact, telephone 
and advertisements. ( R. 22) During the period of time 
that the applicant was performing these duties, he was 
furnished a company truck by Terminex. ( R. 23) The 
applicant would report to the office in the morning and 
obtain the company truck prior to commencing work. 
(R. 24) The truck carried an identification entitled 
"Terminex of Utah." (R. 24) Also, a company um· 
form was issued to him in the form of a white smock 
which had a designation on the back for "Pest-Control 
Service." ( R. 25) The applicant received compensa· 
tion based upon a guaranteed wage of $3.10 per hour 
for 40 hours per week plus a commission in regard to 
his sales so that he earned approximately $850.00 per 
d h. \\11 month. ( R. 26) On some occasions he use is 0 
2 
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rchide in selling the services of Terminex for which 
he \\'Crnld receive no reimbursement. (R. 26) The de-
fe11dant Terminex, Inc. is a corporation of which the 
Jpplicant owns a substantial percentage of the outstand-
ing stock. The claimant had, on prior occasions, that is, 
in I9G2 and 1964, done suney work for a short period 
of time. ( R. 47 & 48) 
The plaintiff in its brief seems to indicate that in 
the month of October, 1966, when Hockenbury changed 
his duties, he was essentially perf arming the same func-
tions that he had done prior to the time that he left Ter-
minex, Inc. The record is clear, however, that the duties 
!hat he was assigned to in the fall of 1966 varied in great 
detail. \Vhen asked on examination the following ques-
lion the claimant answered as fallows: 
"Q. Now, directing your attention to this 
October or November time, did your duties 
change in any manner? 
"A. Extremely." (R. 27, 28) 
It appears from the record that Mr. Hockenbury's di-
rect supervisor, Mr. Nelson, was contacted by an officer 
of the plaintiff, concerning the borrowing of employees 
lrom 'l'erminex. Mr. Christensen, a representative of 
Deseret Architects and Engineers, testified as follows: 
"In this conversation with Mr. Nelson, Mr. 
Hockenbury and Mr. Schmidt were made avail-
able to us, on the basis that we would take them 
nt the time that they were not needed at Termi-
nex, that we would ·reimburse Terminex of Utah 
3 
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their standard hourly rate, plus 20% for payroll 
tax deduction and office overhead, and this type 
of expenditures relevant to payroll." (R. 70) 
T 
As mentioned earlier, at this time .Mr. Hocken. 
bury's duties varied in great detail. He returned h~ 
uniform to Terminex and entered into a new arrange· 
1 
ment in regard to compensation. \Vhen working for 
Deseret Architects and Engineers he was paid a salary 
based on an hourly basis plus time and a half for over. 
time over a forty hour week. Obviously, he received no 
compensation based upon commissions because he 11al 
selling no particular service or product at the time he 
was employed by Deseret. He was compensated for 
the use of his own automobile at IOc a mile by Deseret. 
On reporting to the off ice of Deseret Architects 
and Engineers he was given a list of places to survey. 
He would determine by personal inspection if the build-
ings had basements and, if so, whether they would be 
a proper fallout shelter ( R. 32) . After he made contact 
with the addresses furnished him he would examine tl1e 
blueprints of the building in order to determine whether 
or not they would be appropriate for fallout shelter) 
and if he could not obtain these blueprints, he would 
measure the sides of the building and draw a diagram 
of the building ( R. 33) . The forms used and all direc· 
tions were given by Deseret. When he finished a list 
of particular areas he would go back to Deseret and 
report to them and receive another list. 
It is clear that once the claimant commenced t~ 1 
work for Deseret then in no manner did Tcrminex dired 
4 
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him in the performance of any of his duties. The un-
l'll!ltested testimony came from the applicant himself 
11 hen he lestif ied as follows: 
"Q. Did Mr. Nelson tell you what to do on 
this job? 
"A. No. 
"(-l. Did he tell you how to do it? 
"A. No. 
''(~. Did he ever delineate any duties you had 
to do subsequent - meaning afterwards, after 
this <late - for Deseret Architects? 
"A. No. 
"(~. Did anyone at Terminex, Inc. ever rec-
ommend or tell you what to do in regards to the 
time you were connected with Deseret Architects? 
"A. No." 
Also at Record 38 the applicant testified as fallows: 
"Q. '\Then you were performing this survey 
work, were you at any time instructed what to do 
by any representative of Terminex, Inc? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Did they in any manner tell you what 
your duties would be, when you were conducting 
this survey? 
"A. They did not. 
"Q. Now you feel that your employer, dur-
ing this period of time, was the Deseret Archi-
tects? 
* * * 
j 
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"A. \\r ~11, I will answer this way, I reported 
to ~r. Christensen on the mornings when I we t 
to his office to do the survey work." n 
The applicant testified (R. 47) as follows: 
. "Q. ~as there a~1y individual at Terminex 
vorp~ra~10n you considered to be your immediaL 
super10r! 
"A. Not while I was working with Deseret." 
The record is clear, therefore, that once the appli-
cant left the services of Terminex that they nor their 
officers in no manner attempted or did control the appli· 
cant's actions. 
The applicant after reporting for work for the 
plaintiff Deseret Architects and Engineers was in-
structed how to prepare the forms which were necessary 
in compiling the data in question (R. 43). All instruc· 
tions were given by a representative of Deseret. Also, 
a camera was furnished to the applicant for the taking 
of the pictures of the buildings in question (R. 43). 
Once the claimant completed a particular project he re· 
turned his work to Deseret and received other locations. 
He was furnished a manual which set forth the basic 
instructions in the compilation of the material in ques· 
tion. 
He reported daily to the off ice of Deseret Archi· 
tects and either talked to Mr. Christensen or his secre· 
tary as to a building that wasn't on the survey or which 
he thought ought to be examined. 
6 
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The plaintiff's brief both in the Statement of Fads 
and Argument emphasizes the fact that the defendant 
Hockenbury reported his injury to Terminex, Inc. 
rather than to Deseret Architects and Engineers. The 
implication that the plaintiff draws from this fact is 
that the claimant himself considered himself an em-
ployee of Terminex rather than Deseret Architects. 
' The tesimony cited above negates this implication or 
inference. The Hearing Examiner, however, in this 
case made inquiry of the applicant as to his reason for 
reporting his accident to Terminex and he testified at 
R. 55 as follows : 
"Q. And you reported the injury to Termi-
nex. 'Vhy didn't you report it to Deseret Archi-
tects? 'Vas it more convenient for you, or what? 
"A. 'Vell, I decided after I had fallen that it 
would take me five minutes to get up, and it was 
about the time I went home, and that it is on the 
way home. So I would have them contact them 
that I had fallen." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF AN 
E:\IPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP EXIST-
l\G BE T\VEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND 
THE DEFENDANT HOCKENBURY IS SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
7 
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It is fundamental and this Court has on many occa. 
sions stated that when one appeals from an order of 1 
the Industrial Commission the issue presented is not j 
whether or not the Supreme Court would have inter- ' 
preted the facts differently, rather, the question pre-
sented is whether or not the Commission's ruling is basea 
upon competent evidence. It is submitted that in this 
case the order of the Industrial Commission cannot oe 
said to be arbitrary and capricious. The order on file 
herein (R. 116, 117, 118) lists 14 findings of factwhico 
sustain their award in this case that the applicant ~for. 
rel Hockenbury, Jr. was an employee of Deseret Archi· 
tects and Engineers at the time of the accident, and as 
such, its carrier, Northwestern National Insurance 
Group, is liable for compensation. 
The plaintiffs in this case are asserting the same argu· 
ment that they made to the Industrial Commission in the 
form of memoranda and other motions. On appeal they 
do not attack the findings as such but argue as to 
the proper interpretation to put on the evidence ad· 
duced at the hearing before the Industrial Commission. 
In a recent case, Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 19 
Utah 2d 367, 431 P. 2d 794, the court set forth the bur· 
den that the appellant has in cases involving rulings o!: 
the Industrial Commission and spoke to the question °1 
credibility and the effect of evidence as follows: 
"Under our statutes and long established deci· 
sional law there are insuperable obstacles to ~e 
O'l'anting of the relief sought bv plaintiffs on t 15 • ~- . ff' tiye)f appeal: it was their burden to show a 1rma · 
8 
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and to so persuade the Commission that Mr. 
c;.arner's death resulted from a disease caused by 
his occupation. lt is the prerogative of the Com-
missiua, and not of any individual witness, or 
en.:11 of the medical panel, to judge the credibility 
of the evidence, and upon the basis of the whole 
evidence to determine the facts. The plaintiffs 
haYing failed to so persuade the Commission, it 
is the duty of this court to survey the evidence 
in ihe light most favorable to the findings aud 
order; and we cannot reverse and compel an 
award unless there is credible evidence without 
substantial contradiction which points so clea~rly 
and persuasively in plaintiffs' favor that failure 
to so find must be regarded as capricious and 
arbitrary. Conversely, if there is any reasonable 
basis in the evidence, or from the lack of evidence, 
which will justify the refusal to so find, we must 
affirm." 
See also Kent v. Industrial Co1nmission, 89 Utah 
381, 57 P. 2d 724; Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commis-
xio11, 67 Utah 17 4, 246 Pac. 698; Vause v. Industrial 
Commission, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P. 2d 1006. 
In the plaintiffs argument under Point I they re-
argue the inferences that should be drawn, they claim, 
from the evidence and state, without citing any specific 
authority, that there was not an implied contract between 
the plaintiff and Mr. Hockenbury. They have cited as 
being "axiomatic" that one becomes an employer or an 
tniployee only on the basis of a contract, express or im-
plied, and cite American Jurisprudence and Corpus 
s . .Juris Secundum. These general authorities set forth 
the proper rule to be considered in cases of this kind. 
9 
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• 
i 
For example, at 35 Am. J ur., page 450, Section 8, tht : 
Encyclopedia states as follows: 
"The relationship [speaking to establishing a 
master-servant relationship] may be created bv 1 
express contract but this is not essential; it ma;· I 
be created as well by conduct which shows th;t 
the parties recognize that one is the employer or 
master and that the other is the employee or 
servant." 
The record is replete with evidence to sustain the 1 
theory that there was a contract of employment between 
Deseret Architects and the defendant Hockenbury (see 
Findings of Fact, R. 116, 117) . I 
I 
The evidence showed: I 
1. That plaintiff Deseret Architects and Engi· 
neers received the benefit of the employee's services. 
2. That Deseret Architects and Engineers super· 
vised and directed Hockenbury in his duties. 
3. That Terminex, Inc. did not control or super· 
vise in any manner his duties when working on the data 
survey for Deseret. 
4. That the compensation and the method of pa)'" 
ment was different when Hockenbury was employed by 
Deseret Architects and Engineers. 
5. That the duties that the employee was engaged 
in differed "extremely" from what he had been doing . 
for Terminex when he was collecting data. 
IO 
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POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID 
\OT ERR IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF 
THE FACTS IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
APPLICANT WAS THE EMPLOYEE OF 
THE PLAINTIFF DESERET ARCHITECTS 
AND ENGINEERS. 
In the Statement of Facts of this brief it appears 
clear that the direction given Hockenbury by the plain-
tiff-employer was more extensive than that set forth in 
plaintiff-appellant's brief. On pages.:/_ and .. le-.. of the 
Statement of Facts a summary is made of Hockenbury's 
cunuection with Deseret Architects. 
The brief of plaintiffs recognized that there is sub-
~tantial authority for the proposition that an employee 
may be a general servant of a particular employer, how-
erer, may be a special servant of another if at the time 
1 of the accident in question the special employer was 
receiYing the benefit of the employee's work. The de-
fendants agree with plaintiff's proposition that the edi-
tors of American Jurisprudence state the prevailing rule 
at the citation given by the plaintiff, that is, 58 Am. J ur., 
3!3, page 812. However, plaintiff's brief fails to com-
plete the sentence quoted. Completed it reads as follows: 
"**the rule may be stated to be that a general 
employer, that is, the employer contracting di-
rectly with the employee, is liable for workmen's 
compensation in the event of an injury to the 
employee unless it is shown by the terms of a 
11 
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loan hiring or similar arrangement that tlit ! 
general employer relinquished for the time beina 
all primary benefits to and substantial right 1'. 
control the work, and if, on the other hand, it 
1
, 
shown b,11 an~ sue~ arrangement that the gener,:! 
employer relznquzshes the services and contro/ 1
1
1 
an employee so that the employee becomes for 
the time being sub;ect to the supervision ui!i 
another, the latter becomes liable for compcmr: 
tion for an injury sustained in the course of surl 
work, and the general employer is absolved frvrr, 
liability therefor." (Emphasis added) 
'l'he assertion that Terminex, Inc. was receil'ina e 
benefits from the contract that Deseret had with tl1t 
government (based upon the fact that Deseret reim· 
bursed Terminex for an additional 20 % over the amoun'. 
actually paid to Hockenbury), is not supported by the 
record. The evidence showed that the purpose of sud 
payment was an adjustment for other expenditum 
such as off ice expenses and payroll taxes. It is stated 
by the plaintiff-appellant that it is "the greatest imposi· 
tion on credulity for Nelson to contend that he receirea 
such a premium for the mere maintenance of the appl1· 
cant's payroll record." This matter was argued exten· 
sively in memorandums at the hearing below. There 
was no evidence that this was for a profit or a sharinf 
in the fruits of Deseret' s contract. Certainly, therefore. 
the Industrial Commission need not have adopted tlir 
theory of the plaintiff that a profit was derived in tlir 
survey work flowing to Terminex. In fact, the eYidene 
was to the contrary. At R. 72 Mr. Christensen, a part 
12 
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uer in the firm of Deseret Architects and Engineers, 
testified as follows : 
"(~. Right. Now, in these prior surveys )fr. 
Nelson had an interest in the survey as such? 
"A. That is the way I understand it. Yes. 
"Q. In the suney in October of 1966 did he 
have any interests as such? 
"A. No." 
The evidence is clear that the 20% figure was for 
the basis of maintaining the bookkeeping entry that was 
necessary in keeping Mr. Hockenbury on Terminex' 
payroll. Mr. Christensen testified at R. 70 as follows: 
"In this conversation with Mr. Nelson, Mr. 
Hockenbury and Mr. Schmidt were made avail-
able to us, on the bases that we would take them 
at the time they were not needed at Terminex, 
that we would reimburse Terminex of Utah their 
standard hourly rate, plus 20% for payroll tax 
deduction and office overhead, and this type of 
expenditures relevant to payroll." 
And again, testimony of Mr. Despain, an employee of 
Terminex, who stated at R. 46: 
" ... but I was given to understand that the 
procedure was to bill Deseret Architects and En-
gineers for the time spent by our men, while they 
were working for them, at their normal hourly 
rate plus 20% to cover any other additional office 
expense and payroll taxes." 
The assumption therefore that Terminex was bene-
filting from the data survey is negated by the testimony 
13 
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cited above; and, in light of such testimony, it cannot!~: 
argued that the Industrial Commission acted arbitrar. J 
and capricious in foiling to make the inference thn! I 
plaintiffs demand. I 
A case that is directly in point is Carnes v. Jndu .. '1 
trial Commission, 73 Arizona 264, 240 P. 2d 536. TD,. 
Industrial Commission denied liability to the corpor3. 
tion which was receiving the services of the lent em 
ployee at the time of the injmy of the applicant. Hi 
Supreme Court reversed the order of the Industnru 
Commission. 
Carnes sustained fatal injuries from an acciden1 1 
arising out of and in the course of his employment. Fm 
about three years prior to the date of the accident he hao 
been employed in California by a California corpora· 
ti on. A few days prior to the date of the accident tnr 11 
manager of the Arizona corpora ti on phoned the prn1· 
dent of the California corporation and asked him to Jena 
Carnes for the purpose of doing welding. Prior to tn1• 
time it had been the custom to borrow skilled employw 
On all of these occasions the employees would rema~ 
on the payroll of the California corporation althougt 
they would be working for the Arizona corporatio~ 
The lending employer would charge the other employ<: 
for a proportionate share of withholding and social Si' 
curity tax together with an amount for bookkeeping. 0: 
the date in question Carnes, the employee, was workin: 
for the company in Phoenix, Arizona welding when t~ 
accident occurred. The Supreme Court of Arizona st 
14 
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forth the annotation in 58 Am. J ur. 812, §343, hereto-
fore quoted, and faced the questions of whether or not 
Cnrnes was an employee of the Arizona corporation. 
The court examined an applicable statute which defined 
regularly employed individuals under their compensa-
tion act. (The New Mexico statute in this regard is 
similar to the Utah statute.) The court found that he 
was within the normal course of the employer's business 
and as such would be considered their employee. Re-
1, spondent in that case made the same argument that 
~ appellant is making here in that it was stated that 
Carnes was a highly skilled workman and therefore did 
G'. not require supervision in his work by the foreman of 
or the Arizona corporation. As such, they urge that the 
an Arizona corporation was not the employer because they 
ra· did not supervise and control his work. The court 
th1 negated this argument and stated as follows: 
:11· 
th: 
eti 
"If respondent's claims were true, then we ask, 
could any highly skilled workman become a spe-
cial employee, unless by chance his special em-
ployer had a sufficient technical knowledge and 
skill to direct the employee in the details of his 
work? 'Ve believe the correct rule is as stated in 
Jones Y. George F. Getty Oil Company, a New 
Mexico case, 10 Cir., 92 F. 2d 255 at page 259: 
'The controlling factor is: For whom is the work 
being performed, and who had the power to con-
trol the work and the employee? The authority 
to determine the work to be done, and the manner 
in which it is to be carried on, necessarily includ~s 
the right to suspend or terminate the work al-
together or, possibly, to exclude the particular 
15 
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emp.loyee from the job, not including the rigl 
to discharge the employee from the service of k 
general employer, * * it:· nor need it include IL 
actual giving of directions to the employee, 
connection with the work he is doing'." • 
The court also considered the fact that Carnes w~ 
not on the payroll of the Arizona corporation but ratk 
on the Califcr11ia corporation's payroll. The court he!1/ 
that th;s fact was not persuasive and stated: I 
I 
" 'The principle is thoroughly well establisn~:1 
at common law that an employee of one maslf! 
who is loaned to another master, and who assendl 
to the change of masters, becomes the servant, for 
the time being, of him to whom he is lent, and tllli 
principle has full application to the master ani 
servant relation under the Compensation Act." 
Another point raised in this case is the fact that tfi, 
Arizona corporation did not pay premiums on the em· 
ployee Carnes and the California corporation had been 
making premiums. This is the same argument made~: 
the plaintiff in this case. The court held that this la: 
is not persuasive in determining the question of Iiabilit· 
for compensation. It appears, therefore, that the pr 
mary test to be used in determining who is liable fr: 
compensation is who received the benefit for the wori 
and services performed at the time of the accident. Sr 
Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Company, 92 F. 2d zj; 
Also see Bamberger Electric Railroad Company v. ft· 
dustrial Commission, 59 Utah 257, 203 Pac. 3.J.5. ,j 
The cases cited by the respondent are, we resper · 
fully submit, not in point. None of the cases cancer 
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the situation of a "lent employee." For example, in 
Heany v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, 20 Atl. 2d 592 the com-
pany entered into an agreement with a third person for 
the lease of a tractor owned by this person. Part of the 
agreement was that the person who owned the tractor 
would furnish all labor. Pursuant to this agreement the 
applicant was hired by the owner of the truck and per-
formed services for him. 
In Creech v. Sirkin, 88 S.E. 2d 697, the owner of 
U1e property contracted with an independent contractor 
for services to be rendered. An employee of the inde-
pendent contractor was injured. The court held that 
the employee did not have a right of compensation 
against the owner. 
The fundamental rule in cases of this kind is found 
ilia Supreme Court case of Denton v. Yazoo~ M.V.R. 
1 Co., et al., 52 S. Ct. 141, 284 U.S. 305, where the court 
held as fallows: 
I 
"YVhether the railroad companies may be held 
liable for Hunter's act depends not upon the fact 
that he was their servant generally, but upon 
whether the work which he was doing at the time 
was their work or that of another; a question 
determined, usually at least, by ascertaining 
under whose authority and command the work 
was being done. \Vhen one person puts his ser-
Yant at the disposal and under the control of 
another for the performance of a particular ser-
rice for the latter, the servant, in respect of his 
acts in that service, is to be dealt with as the 
serrnnt of the latter and not of the former. This 
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rule is element~1y and finds support in a larii: 
number of dec1s1ons, a few only of which neri 
b~ cited." ·1 
Plamtiff concludes its brief by stating that theer,I 
of the Industrial Commission decision is that it adoi:,i 
a concept that a homeowner who contracts for servi~: 
and gives direction to personnel sent to perform t~; 
services be~omes an employer subject to the liabilitir 
of the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act. The effecto 
this decision is not to extend workmen's compensatio~ 
to this type of situation. In order for the special em-
ployer to be held liable, he must be one subject to tlli 
YV orkmen' s Compensation Act as defined by statute 
Certainly the homeowner as set forth by plaintiff ink 
example would not fall into this category. See Ocea: 
Accident and Guaranty Corporation v. Peter Pou/sea 
244 'Vis. 286, 12 N.W. 2d 129, 152 ALR 810. 
From the foregoing it appears clear that at If:; 
time of the accident Mr. Hockenbury was performini 
1 
a service for the plaintiffs; that there was sufficient eic· 
dence to sustain the Industrial Commission's order. T~ 1 
plaintiff makes a point that there was no negotiatio~ 1 
with the claimant in reference to his new employmen: 
or wages and as such he cannot be considered a specW t 
employee of Deseret. 
An interesting case regarding this general problem u 
is Murray v. Wasatch Grading Company, 73 Utah4iti 
27 4 Pac. 940. In this case the issue presented was wilt· 
f ti def en1I· ther or not the plaintiff was the employee o 1e 11 
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ant Wasatch Grading Company or the Denver and Rio 
Grande \Vestern Railroad Company. Defendant was a 
eonstructiou company engaged in the construction of a 
state ruad in Utah County. The contract with the state 
1 provided that the D. & R.G. Railroad Company would 
' provide to the contractor "competent railroad employees 
as may be necessary for the proper protection of the rail-
road property for traveling public." Because of a blast-
ing operation it became necessary for 'Vasatch Grading 
Company to be advised in advance of the arrival of 
trains so that the track could be clear to permit the free 
and uninterrupted passage of such trains. Before 
plaintiff began his employment at the construction site 
c he had been employed by the Denver and Rio Grande 
!: Western Railroad Company. A superintendent of D. 
n ~ R. G. brought the plaintiff to the construction site 
and informed him of his wages and the hours that 
would be required in performing his new duties. While 
ni not engaged in communicating with the train dispatcher 
r. it was required of the plaintiff to assist the defendant's 
'~ employees in removing rock and debris from the rail-
io: road track. The defendant \V asatch Grading Com-
10: pany carried compensation with the State Insurance 
:i~ Fund, however, did not list the plaintiff as one of its 
employees at the time of the injury. The plaintiff was 
injured when assisting the employees of the defendant 
lee · 
Ill remoYing from the railroad tracks some rocks that 
1111 l 
uad been thrown upon the track. The agreement be-
;ut· tween the defendant and D. & R. G. was that the rail-~011 
road company would maintain the plaintiff on its 
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payroll and that the defendant would reimburst 
railroad company for the money paid to the plaim 
by D. & R. G. The court held that in determining[ 
question of who was an employee one referred tu, 
law of master and senant. The plaintiff, when injur· 
was working under a contract of hire and was enga; 
in the usual course and business and occupation of i 
construeti<Pl company. The court held that under t[1, 
circumstances that the employee while working~• 
benefiting the construction company in keeping 1 
railroad track clear, was to be considered an empk 
of said company and therefore his exclusive reim 
was against it for compensation under the '¥orkmc 
Compensation Act. 
Certainly in this particular case there were no lit~ 
tiations between the employee and the special emplni 
but, nevertheless, a contract of employment was fo 
and the determination made that he was an emplrn· 
of the construction company. 
CONCLUSION 
. . 'i 
The evidence sustains the Industnal Comm1ssJ11 i 
order in this matter that at the time of the accidenll 
I 
question the defendant Murrel Hockenbury, Jr., wa1-i 
employee of Deseret Architects and Engineers and it[ 
his insurance carrier, the Northwestern National L ! 
Insurance Company, is liable for all compensation. ' 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondei 
20 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
